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CAMPUS PAMPHLETEERING: THE EMERGING
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
I. INTRODUTION
Beginning with Lovell v. City of Griffin,1 the Supreme Court
has consistently held the distribution of handbills to be a funda-
mental right under the first amendment. 2 Since Lovell, the Court
has liberally construed the concept of a public forum where first
amendment rights can be properly exercised.3 More recently, the
Court has held that schools cannot arbitrarily or absolutely regu-
late students' constitutional rights of expression. 4 These three
principles would suggest great protection for handbilling rights on
state university campuses.
A further analysis of case law indicates that broad free speech
standards governing such rights exist and that the exercise of
university regulatory power in this area is constitutionally sus-
pect.5 The purpose of this article is to determine the nature and
extent of these constitutional standards. 6 Therefore, it is neces-
1 303 U.S. 444 (1938), where the Court overruled a city ordinance which banned the
distribution of handbills without prior permission from the city manager.2 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), discussed in note 26 infra; Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), where the Court invalidated a city ordinance banning dis-
tribution of literature; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), where the Court again
overruled a municipal ordinance prohibiting all leafleting: Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946), discussed in text accompanying note 7 infra; and Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960), where the Court held unconstitutional a regulation banning the distribution of
leaflets which did not contain the distributor's name and address.3 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966); Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968). But compare Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The above cases are all
discussed in the text accompanying notes 7- 12 infra.
4 See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
5 See Jones v. Board of Regents, 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970), where the court struck
down a university regulation prohibiting all handbilling on campus. Cf. Norton v. Dis-
cipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 906 (1970). In Norton, the court upheld university disciplinary action against stu-
dents who distributed leaflets, even though the university had not adopted a prohibitory
regulation. For a discussion of the Norton case, see Comment, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1260
(1970).
Several state-supported institutions of varying sizes in different geographical areas of
the nation responded to this writer's request for regulations controlling distribution of
leaflets on their respective campuses. See note 52 infra for an evaluation of these regu-
lations.
6 The content of handbills or leaflets is not considered here. The right of distribution is
at all times the focal point of this article. For readers who find it difficult to disregard the
content issue, a brief but thorough discussion of prior restraints based on content is
present in Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1481, 1503-1509
(1970). See also O'Neil, Reflections on the Academic Senate Resolution, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 88, 98 (1966).
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sary to consider the extent to which a state university is a public
forum, the requisites of a constitutionally permissible regulation
governing state campus handbilling, and finally, when a state
university may bar handbilling regardless of the existence of or
compliance with a regulation.
II. A PUBLIC FORUM ON A STATE UNIVERSITY CAMPUS
A. An Objective Test
Since Marsh v. Alabama,7 where the Court held that a private-
ly-owned town with all the features of a public municipality was
sufficiently "public" in appearance and nature to make a blanket
ban on first amendment activities unconstitutional, both the Su-
preme Court and lower courts have wrestled with the problem of
public forums. In Edwards v. South Carolina,8 the Court ruled
that state capitol grounds were open to the public for freedom of
assembly purposes. Next, public streets and sidewalks near a
courthouse were deemed open to the public for purposes of an
orderly demonstration in Cox v. Louisiana.9 Then in Brown v.
Louisiana,10 four justices reasoned that a public library was a
public forum. In that same term, the Court, in Adderley v. Flor-
ida,"' distinguished a jail grounds from capitol grounds and the
area adjacent to a courthouse. Jail grounds were declared not
open to the public for the exercise of first amendment activities.
Finally, in Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza,12 the Court found a privately-owned shopping cen-
ter sufficiently public in nature to permit picketing against a mem-
ber store's allegedly unfair labor practices.' 3 In each of these
cases the Court relied upon the particular factual situation in-
volved in order to reach its decision. Although many similar
7326 U.S. 501 (1946).
8372 U.S. 229 (1963).
9 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
10383 U.S. 131 (1966). Justice White concurred but did not consider the public forum
question.
11 385 U.S. 19 (1966).
12391 U.S. 308 (1968).
13 However, in Logan Valley, the Court left open the question of whether first amend-
ment activities had to be related to shopping center property uses in order to be protected.
Nevertheless lower courts have held that a privately owned shopping center is a public
forum for the exercise of the full range of first amendment activities. See State v. Miller,
280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968), where a petitioner's trespass convictions for
political leafleting in a privately owned shopping center were reversed notwithstanding the
fact that the leaflet's subject matter did not relate to the shopping center. For a similar
result, see Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F.Supp. 128 (D.Ore. 1970), where handbill
distribution occurred in a Portland, Oregon, shopping center, and Diamond v. Bland, 91
Cal. Rptr. 501, 477 P.2d 733 (1970) where leafleting as well as gathering of signatures took
place in a San Bernardino, California, shopping center.
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factors were considered in reaching these decisions, the Court has
yet to formulate an objective test for determining what constitutes
a public forum.14
Certain areas on state university grounds are generally acces-
sible to the public. There are, however, no explicit standards as to
what areas may or may not be open to the public for the exercise
of free speech rights.1 5 An objective test for determining what
constitutes a public forum has been suggested by the Second
Circuit in Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Authority. 16 The Wolin dispute
arose when individuals associated with two groups opposed to the
Vietnam War entered the Port Authority bus terminal in New
York City to distribute anti-war leaflets near several boarding
gates. Both parties agreed that the conduct of the pamphleteers
was peaceful and caused no interference with traffic.1 7 The Wolin
court, in holding that the terminal was an appropriate public
forum for handbilling and other related free speech activity, noted
that in order to determine what constitutes a public forum a court
should consider: (1) the character of the place in question, (2) the
patterns of activity which usually occur in the area, (3) the essen-
tial purpose of the area, and (4) the number and classes of persons
who use it. These four factors determine whether the place is a
suitable forum for communication of views on politically and
socially significant issues.18
B. Application of an Objective Test to a State University
In applying any public forum test to a campus, consideration
should be given to the effect of the regulatory power of a state
university over a particular area on its campus. A university might
designate areas of its campus, or perhaps the entire campus, as
off-limits to everyone except students or persons otherwise con-
nected with the university. Denying the public the right to use
such areas would prohibit normal first amendment access to
non-students and individuals not affiliated with the university. In
14 For a more complete discussion of the public forum concept, see Kalven, The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1. Other cases in the
public forum area where first amendment activity was ruled valid include: Wolin v. Port of
N.Y. Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968) (New York Port
Authority Terminal); People v. St. Clair, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 388, 56 Misc. 2d 326 (1968)
(New York City Transit System-subway platform); People v. Solomonow, 291 N.Y.S.
2d 145, 56 Misc. 2d 1050 (1968) (New York streets in front of foreign embassies); In re
Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353 (1967) (Los Angeles Union
Railroad Station).
15 See Comment, The University and the Public: The Right of Access by Nonstudents
to University Property, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 166- 168 (1968).
16 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
17 Id. at'85-86.
18 Id. at 89.
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light of a university's public nature and the presence of areas
generally accessible to the public, regulations of this type would
seem constitutionally suspect. 19
In general, a state university is not so unique that special
considerations should determine the issue of a public forum for
handbilling. If, in resolving this issue, the courts would examine
factors similar to those suggested in Wolin, many university areas
would be permissible public forums. Of course a university could
still exclude some areas from the public forum category. For
example, classrooms where teaching is occurring are in-
appropriate because not generally open to the public. On the other
hand, the corridors adjacent to those classrooms might be valid
areas for free speech. Student unions, streets, walks, and park
areas would almost certainly fall into the public forum category.
Likewise, where handbill distribution is prohibited in a specific
campus area but is permissible directly across the street, there is
no justification for disallowing the activity in one place but not the
other if both areas are similarly accessible to the public. 20
While the nature of a university may not be so unique as to
require special considerations to govern the issue of a public
forum for handbilling, this is not to say that all first amendment
activities on campus are entitled to the same degree of protection
19 A discussion of this issue and its ramifications is beyond the scope of this study. For a
thorough discussion of the issues raised above, see Comment, The University and the
Public: The Right of Access by Nonstudents to University Property, supra note 15, which
discusses in detail CAL. PENAL CODE § 602.7 (West Supp. 1968), as amended CAL. PENAL
CODE § 626.6 (West Supp. 1970), a law designed to stop interference with university
activities. The statute was written and passed in response to the Free Speech Movement
of 1964-65.
20 With respect to these problems, see Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), where the Court of Appeals of New
York ruled that inner hallways in a large private apartment building complex were not
public areas open to Jehovah's Witnesses for distribution of religious matter. The opinion
noted that the group's right to distribute leaflets on the public (or private) sidewalks in the
apartment complex was not infringed. But see Note, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1105 (1948),
which suggests the case may have been wrongly decided. The author argues that because
of the enormous size of the complex the building's inner hallways were comparable to
sidewalks in front of homes on public streets.
See also Bowling Green v. Lodico, I1 Ohio St.2d 135, 228 N.E.2d 325 (1967), where
socialist magazines were being distributed on a public sidewalk on Bowling Green Univer-
sity's campus. The court assumed the sidewalk to be a public way and not a street of the
university, before proceeding to overturn a city solicitation ordinance. However, under the
proposed test, the "across the street" distinction would be invalid when public and
university property have identical characteristics except that one area is within campus
boundaries. See Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968). See also In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353
(1967), and Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F.Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970), where courts
specifically rejected the argument that the university's regulatory provision was valid
because free speech activity could be carried on in nearby areas.
[VOL. 5: 1
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that should be afforded handbilling. Close attention must be paid
to the nature and scope of the activity in question. In public forum
cases, lower courts have distinguished leafleting from picketing or
mass demonstrations, granting greater protection to the former
activity. 21
The reasons for this distinction can easily be illustrated. For
example, for purposes of handling mass demonstrations, a univer-
sity campus is often quite different from a town or city. On many
campuses, security police can provide only limited control of
mass demonstrations. To allow widespread areas on a university
to become appropriate public forums for all freedom of expression
purposes might create utter chaos.22 Distribution of literature,
however, usually involves relatively few people who occupy only
a limited area. Campus authorities should be able to control this
activity in many, if not all, areas of a university.
III. TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE REGULATION
Given that handbilling is a favored first amendment right 23 and
that many public forum areas do exist on state university campus-
es, the determination of what constitutes a permissible regulation
21 In Farmer v. Moses, 232 F.Supp 154 (S.D.M.Y. 1964), a federal district court ruled
that the New York World's Fair Corporation could not prohibit handbill distribution inside
the fair grounds, but that picketing could be proscribed. The court distinguished the two
rights by noting that the fair was not like a street for picketing purposes since it
constituted an enclosed area containing large numbers of persons. A more recent decision,
Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F.Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970), which concerned handbill
distribution in a shopping center (see note 13, supra), stated that the distribution of leaflets
is pure speech and a protected activity, whereas picketing may be enjoined.
22 In Evers v. Birdsong, 287 F.Supp. 900 (S.D. Miss. 1968), mass parades and demon-
strations were attempted on the campus of Alcorn A & M College. The marches, led by
Charles Evers, degenerated into near riots several times. They caused more than slight
damage to university property and resulted in thefts of police equipment. In granting an
injunction against further marches, the court noted at 905:
School campuses are not public in the sense of streets, courthouses, and public
parks, open for expressions of free speech by the public. A college campus,
particularly in an isolated area as is Alcorn, is vulnerable to the attentions
occasioned by even the most orderly parade or assembly.
Note, however, that both the fact situation and language of Evers dealt only with parades
and demonstrations, not leafleting.
23 The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that free speech protections do not apply to
commercial solicitation. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), where a
regulation proscribing handbill distribution only for commercial purposes was ruled valid.
The Court noted that a legislature could regulate commercial distribution and solicitation.
In Breard v. City of AleKandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), the Court reaffirmed a municipal-
ity's right to regulate commercial solicitation in upholding Alexandria's ordinance forbid-
ding commercial canvassing door-to-door. However, the Court was careful in Breard to
distinguish Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), where the Court struck down a
municipal ordinance barring all door-to-door handbill distribution regardless of the house-
holder's wishes. In Martin, the statute was a blanket prohibition and not limited to
commercial material.
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becomes important. In the past, blanket prohibitions on handbill
distribution generally have been invalidated by the courts as un-
constitutional denials of free speech rights.2 4 In certain rare in-
stances, however, a state's interest has been held to override its
citizens' first amendment rights and a blanket prohibition has been
upheld.2 5
Universities should strive to draft regulations which contain
only reasonable and objective limitations on handbilling.2 6 A re-
cent decision, Jones v. Board of Regents,2 7 suggests that a per-
In People v. Bohnke, 287 N.Y. 154, 38 N.E.2d 478 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 667
(1942), the New York Court of Appeals upheld an ordinance barring all handbill dis-
tribution on private property without the consent of the occupant. The saving factors of
the statute in Bohnke evidently were the private property notion and the consent stipula-
tion. These provisions would allow distribution of literature to some persons, thus avoiding
the statute's being labelled a blanket prohibition.24 See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), discussed in note I supra; Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), and Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), both
discussed in note 2 supra; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), discussed in note 23
supra; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), discussed in note 26 infra.
See, e.g., People v. Davis, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 981, 38 Misc. 2d 771 (1963), and City of
Elizabeth v. Sullivan, 100 N.J. Super. 51, 241 A.2d 41 (1968) with respect to blanket
prohibitions on handbilling. See also Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968)
(picketing); Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F.Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (mass demon-
stration); State v. Corbisiero, 67 N.J. Super. 170, 170 A.2d 74 (1961) (mass meeting). The
above citations are noted only as examples of the approaches taken by lower courts in
holding statutes invalid and do not represent a comprehensive listing of all the cases in the
area.
5In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court held a Massachusetts
statute, which prohibited boys under twelve and girls under eighteen from selling period-
icals on the streets, valid as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. The state's interest in
protecting children outweighed the claims of religious immunity. The Court held that the
state's interest in protecting children from economic exploitation prevailed over the in-
dividual's right of freedom of the press. However, Prince may not be the law today. See 83
HARV. L. REV. 154, 158 (1969).
26 One type of regulation generally considered to be a reasonable and objective limita-
tion on distribution of handbills is a littering ordinance.
In Chicago Park Dist v. Lyons, 39 111. 2d 584, 237 N.E.2d 519, cert. de-niied, 393 U.S.
939 (1968) the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a minister's conviction for littering under
the Chicago Park District Code. The cleric had distributed religious literature on a three
thousand car parking lot by placing material on each car's windshield. Noting that a
municipality can reasonably regulate first amendment activity, the court determined that
the ordinance was a reasonable one, for it was intended only to prevent littering of the park
district. However, littering ordinances which act as barriers against the communication of
ideas are not constitutionally acceptable. In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), the
Court stated at 163: "the public convenience in repsect to cleanliness of the streets does
not justify an extention of the police power which invades the free communication of
information and opinion secured by the Constitution."
However, statutes which contain imprecise standards subject to broad discretionary
decision-making power in an individual are inherently suspect throughout the first amend-
ment area. In Resistance v. Commissioners of Fair. P., 298 F.Supp. 961 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
a district court judge overruled park regulations governing demonstrations. The court
noted that there were no clear standards to guide the Park Commission Director's exercise
of discretion in granting parade permits. In delineating what the standards ought to be in
this situation, the court set guidelines which limited the time duration of the demonstration,
the number of persons allowed to be in attendance, and the manner of conduct and control
during and after the demonstration.
27436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970). For the holding in Jones, see note 5 supra and the
discussion in the text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
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missible regulation would be one designed to prevent disruption of
ordinary educational activities on the campus as well as to insure
non-interference with other persons legitimately occupying the
school's public areas. 28 If regulations of this type impose only
reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions on the right to
distribute handbills, they should be constitutionally permissible. 29
Nevertheless, a problem remains in determining what is reason-
able.
Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Authority30 offers assistance in formulat-
ing constitutionally permissible standards for valid handbilling
regulations. The Wolin court directed that new standards be
drawn up to protect against excessive disruption of normal activi-
ties. Its opinion noted that the character of the place, the number
of persons passing through the area, and the forum's design are all
relevant factors in determining the permissible degree of restric-
tion on free speech activity. 31
If factors similar to those examined in Wolin were applied to
regulations governing handbill distribution on a univeristy
campus, the resulting limitations on the university's broad- dis-
cretionary powers should be acceptable to both the university and
the public.32 However, operating within a narrowly drawn regu-
lation, a university might still be able greatly to limit handbill
distribution by alleging that the area in question, although a public
place, is too heavily congested and limited in space to allow free
speech expressions for even a limited time. Thus, courts should
place a heavy burden of proof on a university before allowing a
restriction on handbill distribution, since this right is one which
can be exercised without great inconvenience in almost all public
areas.
IV. INTERFERENCE WITH A UNIVERSITY'S NORMAL ACTIVITIES
Irrespective of whether a regulation exists, sufficient in-
terference with university activities will justify a prohibition on
handbilling. 33 The test set out in Tinker v. Des Moines School
28 Id. at 620.
29See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), where the Court upheld a New
Hampshire statute regulating parades by narrowing the statute to include as necessary
requirements for receipt of a parade permit only "time, place and manner."
30 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
31 Id. at 93.
32 See O'Neil, Reflections on the Academic Senate Resolution, supra note 6, at 104 for
a further discussion of the impact that a time, place, and manner regulation of free speech
activities may have on a university campus.
33 Norton v. Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969),
FALL 197 1]
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Dist.3 4 applies in determining whether there is sufficient in-
terference with educational activities to allow prohibition of first
amendment rights. 35 Tinker held that in order to prohibit the
exercise of free speech rights there must be a showing of "facts
which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school ac-
tivities." 36 Unfortunately, the Tinker standard is not easily ap-
plied in a university setting. 37
Lower courts have differed in their application of the standard.
In Norton v. Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ.3 8 the
Sixth Circuit upheld by a 2- 1 vote university disciplinary action
against students for distributing leaflets. The court determined
that the Tinker test was satisfied by the college administrator's
forecast of disturbances as a result of the distribution of leaflets
asserting students' rights of expression on the campus. 39 In-
terestingly, there was no regulation involved in the Norton case;
rather, the court ruled that the university had inherent authority to
maintain discipline and could therefore punish the students re-
sponsible for the leafleting. 40
On the other hand, in Jones v. Board of Regents4' a Ninth
Circuit panel unanimously decided that a non-student's pamphle-
teering was an insufficient interference with university activities to
justify an order compelling him to cease his activites and leave the
campus.4 2 In Jones actual disturbances occurred and the leafleting
violated a university regulation prohibiting distribution of hand-
bills.4 3 In short, the Ninth Circuit's approach to the Tinker stan-
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 906 (1970); Jones v. Board of Regents, 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.
1970). For the holdings in these cases, see supra note 5.
34 393 U.S. 503 (1969), where the Court upheld secondary school students' first amend-
ment rights. The students in Tinker wore black armbands to school in protest against the
Vietnam War. The court concluded that this form of protest was appropriate first amend-
ment expression.
35 See in addition to Jones, supra, and Norton, infra, Siegel v. Regents, 308 F.Supp.
832, 836 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Speaker v. Grantham, 317 F.Supp. 1253, 1273-1274 (S.D.
Miss. 1970); Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 318 F.Supp. 608, 615 (M.D. Penn. 1970);
American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F.Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970);
Pickings v. Bruce, 430 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1970). These cases all employ the Tinker test. A
good listing of cases involving challenges to university authority as infringing first amend-
ment rights can be found in American Civil Liberties Union, supra , at 896-897.
36 393 U.S. at 514.
37 As indicated in note 34 supra, Tinker concerned a public high school student's free
speech rights, as did Burnside v. Byars, 363, F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) from which Tinker
adopted the material and substantial interference rule.
38419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 906 (1970).
39 Id. at 199, 201-204.
40 Id. at 200.
41 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970).
42 Id. at 621.
43 Id. at 619, 620.
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dard with respect to leafleting on university campuses is far more
favorable toward first amendment rights than is the Sixth Cir-
cuit's.
A solution to the conflict would be to disallow all arbitrary
prohibitions on free speech activity. To restrict handbilling would
then demand a realistic and dangerous threat of disturbance. Once
the free speech activity falls outside the proscription of a con-
stitutionally permissible regulation or, in the absence of such a
regulation, once it is determined that the activity does not result in
material interference with a university's operations, the activity
would be protected. The long history of decisions protecting first
amendment rights would then become applicable. 4 4
The importance of free speech on university campuses and the
privilege to be free from danger and coercion while exercising that
right cannot be overestimated. 45 Thus, when a handbilling regu-
lation is at issue, close attention should be given to its nature and
scope. As suggested previously, blanket prohibitions on hand-
billing are inherently suspect.46 However, if the regulation does
not impose a blanket prohibition and if there is no compliance
with the regulation, then a different standard may govern the
prevention of handbilling. Regulations narrowly drawn to limit,
rather than to bar completely, handbill distribution can be ex-
pected to survive constitutional scrutiny. 47 The decisions general-
44E.g., the Court held in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949), that a function of
free speech is to invite dispute. Free speech could be stopped only if it could be shown as
likely to produce a "clear and present danger" of substantive evil rising above in-
convenience, annoyance, or unrest. The Court thus echoed the "clear and present danger"
test first established in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), by Justice Holmes.
The Court's past and present use of the test is, however, difficult to define. Indeed, in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the concurring opinions of Justices Black and
Douglas suggest the test has no place in the first amendment area, since it serves only to
limit free expression. Although not an absolute right (see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942)), there exists a presumption in favor of the first amendment which
accompanies free speech rights once the exercise is determined to be speech. A discussion
of the "clear and present danger" test and its meaning today is beyond this discussion. It is
important nonetheless to note the broad protection which the first amendment gives
persons validly exercising free speech rights on university campuses.
4 See in this regard: Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1131- 1132 (1968); Schwartz, The Student, the University and the First Amend-
ment, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 635-686 (1970); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22
VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1969).
46 In Jones v. Board of Regents, 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970), the regulation was a
blanket prohibition on handbilling which the court determined to be inherently suspect and
invalidly applied. The overwhelming implication in Jones is that the statute is overbroad,
but the court never explicitly invalidates it on such grounds. For a discussion of over-
breadth in university regulations, see Comment, Vagueness and Overbreadth in University
Regulations, 2 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 255- 269 (197 1).
47 See Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446, 393 P.2d 428, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1964),
involving a statute which limited the distribution of handbills dealing with election cam-
paigning for particular candidates. Only those materials bearing the names of the publisher
and persons for whom the leaflets were published could be distributed. The court dis-
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ly employ a balancing approach which weighs the regulation's
inhibitory effect on handbilling against its avowed purpose of
safeguarding the public.48
An identical test for determining what constitutes sufficient
interference with university activities to allow prohibitions on
leafleting might be used in all cases. The courts, however, do not
seem inclined to follow this course. For example, in Norton49
there was no regulation, and yet the court treated the situation as
though a narrow regulation, that is, one which would only reason-
ably limit handbilling, existed. Thus the standard for determining
interference with university activities was lowered and the
leafleting was restricted by actually punishing those students en-
gaged in the activity. In the court's opinion the students had
exceeded their first amendment rights, even though no violation of
a constitutionally permissible regulation had occurred.
In practical effect, a court is more likely to view prohibitions on
leafleting favorably when imposed by a narrowly drawn regu-
lation, drafted specifically to stop a particular interference with
legitimate activities. In other words, the court would likely hold
that a valid legislative determination had been made that the
prohibited activity must be barred because of interference with
legitimate activities.50 Conversely, a court would more likely view
pamphleteering as a protected activity on a campus where a
regulation purports to bar all leaflet distribution. 51
Unfortunately, irrespective of whether a broad, a narrow, or no
tinguished Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), as a case in which the statute involved
barred all handbills distributed anonymously. The Canon court went on to hold that
where a regulation is limited in scope, a balancing test, which would weigh the inhibitory
effect on first amendment handbilling activities against the state's purpose in requiring
disclosure of the distributors, should be used. The opinion also noted that this balancing
could be discarded when the statute created an unlimited restriction. (The state's interests
were held justifiable here, although the statute was held invalid on other grounds.) But
compare Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F.Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
394 U.S. 103 (1969), where a similar New York statute was held invalid by a three-judge
district court panel in a lengthy opinion. The state's competing interests did not justify
restricting free speech rights in Zwickler. For another case where balancing was employed,
see People v. Strauss, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 431,48 Misc. 2d 1006 (1965).
48 See note 47 supra.
49419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969). See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
50 An interesting example of this reasoning is at work in the "Pentagon Papers" case,
New York Times Co. v. United States, 39 U.S.L.W. 4879 (U.S. June 30, 1971), in which
the Supreme Court overruled an injuction barring publication of a government study of the
Vietnam War. The six members of the majority determined that the executive branch of
the Government, pursuant to its inherent authority, could not prohibit publication. How-
ever, three members of the Court suggest that if a narrowly drawn statute which prohibited
disclosure of certain vital government documents had existed, a different decision might
have been reached. See the concurring opinions of Justices Brenan, Stewart, and White, 39
U.S.L.W. at 4882-4887.
51 There may be disagreement, however, as to when a regulation on its face bars all
handbill distributions. See Mr. Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60. 67 (1960).
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regulation is involved, the courts currently decide the issue of
what constitutes sufficient interference with university activities
to allow prohibition of handbilling on an ad hoc basis. However,
in reaching their decision, the courts will be influenced sig-
nificantly by the presence or absence of a regulation as well as by
a regulation's scope and purpose. Courts ruling on handbilling
rights should use no narrower standards of measuring interference
with ordinary activities for exercise of free speech rights in state
university public forums than in other public forums. Courts do
attempt to determine what activity constitutes sufficient in-
terference with the ordinary activities of a place (e.g., a railroad
terminal or a bus station) to allow a prohibition of the activity in
that forum. Whether these determinations employ standards more
liberal than Tinker's "substantial disruption or material in-
terference" with legitimate activities test before disallowing first
amendment rights remains unclear. The first amendment should,
however, keep its "preferred position" on university campuses. 52
52 Letters of inquiry regarding university regulations controlling handbill distribution
were sent to thirty state universities and colleges of varying sizes. Twelve replies were
received. Three schools have no regulations controlling leafleting; four schools have
regulations which were arguably valid. Five institutions, however, have regulations clearly
invalid under the standards proposed in this article. One regulations absolutely bars
distribution by non-students, while another vests vague and broad discretionary powers
over leafleting in university officials. The remaining three regulations are invalid since
anonymous distribution of handbills is prohibited. See Talley v. California, discussed in
note 2 supra. Eleven of the twelve replies offered no information on the issue of
non-students' rights. Non-students' handbilling rights under the first amendment are not
lost in public forum areas on state university campuses, however, and Jones v. Board of
Regents, 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970), supports this conclusion. See also Comment, The
University and the Public: The Right ofAccess by Nonstudents to University Property,
supra note 15.
Many of the schools responded additionally with their commercial solicitation regu-
lations. Most universities have provisions designed to reach door-to-door selling in dormi-
tories, "hawking" all over the campuses, etc. Lately, these commercial solicitation rules
have been confronted with constitutional. objections. They often are too extensive and
infringe upon the right of freedom of the press. The Universtiy of Arkansas responded that
its solicitation regulation is being challenged, as did Southern Illinois University. The
Southern Illinois regulation was subsequently upheld in Graham v. Davis, Civil No. 69-64
(E.D. Ill., May 23, 1969). More recently, Texas Tech's prohibition on the sale of a campus
newspaper was struck down by a district court ruling in Channing Club v. Board
of Regents, 317 F.Supp. 688 (N.D. Tex. 1970). The court refused to rule on the school's
regulations and overruled the ban on sale solely on constitutional grounds. University
officials had barred sale of the paper on account of its language at a time when several
other publications offered for sale at the university contained identical language. The court
ruled that the first and fourteenth amendments (equal protection clause) protected the right
to sell the paper.
A case involving similar facts is now before the Supreme Court. Board of Regents v.
New Left Education Project, appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1970)
(No. 1100), involves rules promulgated by the University of Texas regents prohibiting
commercial or noncommercial solicitation on University of Texas campuses. The lower
court ruled against the regulations, finding them violative of first amendment rights. See.
also the Court's most recent handbilling decision, Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 39 U.S.L.W. 4577 (U.S. May 17, 1971), where the Court ruled that distribution of
literature critical of a real estate broker's policies in a racially troubled Chicago area could
not be prohibited
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V. CONCLUSION: THE LARGER IMPLICATIONS
In view of the fact that a university fosters the development
and discussion of ideas, it should be a more appropriate forum
than public streets or parks for at least certain free speech activi-
ties. 53 Handbilling would easily be among the protected activities
because of its limited inconvenience and its close relation to pure
speech.
The emerging constitutional standards discussed throughout
this article may affect leafleting on campuses of private as well as
state universities and colleges. The distinction between a state
university campus area (where state action is clear-cut) and a
similar area on a private university campus has little significance if
the area is open to the public generally. 4 When the concept of a
university as an open forum for ideas and discussion is combined
with a factual determination that a place is generally available for
public use, a private university's campus may be as public as a
state school's campus. The standards for determining whether a
campus area should be a forum for public free speech activity
would thus be equally applicable to a private university situ-
ation.55 For example, libraries or student unions generally open to
the public on both state and private university campuses would
appear indistinguishable for first amendment purposes.
The inherent nature of a university may demand free speech
access to certain areas which a private university has not made
generally available to the public, 56 even though no clear authority
exists for compelling a private university to allow public access to
such areas. Once an area has been made available for public use,
a private university would have difficulty in arbitrarily prohibiting
constitutionally protected forms of expression.
This article suggests that the right to distribute handbills on
campuses applies equally to students and non-students. To permit
handbilling without prior restraint by all persons or groups on
public areas of a university campus may create problems. How-
ever, even now when protests have degenerated into violence and
tragedy on university campuses, the first amendment and its regu-
53See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 45, at 1054: "Be-
cause of its devotion to scholarship and academic inquiry, the university conforms to the
'marketplace of ideas' concept even more fully than the public forum."
54 See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968), discussed in text accompanying note 12 supra.
55 See Part II, supra in text.
-1 One interpretation of Logan Valley, discussed supra in the text accompanying note
12, reasons that the inherent qualities of certain property render that area an appropriate
public forum. Thus, availability for public use would not be the sole criteria.
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lated privileges should take precedence over the fear of distur-
bance. In an angry dissent to the denial of certiorari in the Norton
case, Justice Marshall, supported by Justices Brennan and
Douglas wrote:
There is a tendency to lump together the burning of buildings
and the peaceful but often unpleasantly sharp expression of
discontent. It seems to me most important that the courts
should distinguish between the two with particular care in
these days, when officials under the pressure of events and
public opinion are tempted to blur the distinction. Our system
promises to college students as to everyone else that they
may have their say, and when it breaks that promise it gives
aid and comfort to those who say that it is a sham.57
The concepts of free speech and academic freedom enjoy a
symbiotic relationship. That relationship will grow and prosper to
the extent that the courts accord campus pamphleteering its full
measure of constitutional protection.
-Morton M. Rosenfeld
57 399 U.S. 906, 909 (1970).
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